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Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Management:
Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 
By Daniel Gervais †  and Alana Maurushat ‡
sans précédents dans ce domaine. Le résultat deAbstract 
l’évolution parfois mal orientée de la législation appli-
cable et la création de multiples sociétés de gestion ont
he collective management of copyright in Canada mené à un fractionnement du droit d’auteur et de saT was conceived as a solution to alleviate the problem gestion. Cet article se penche sur le problème du frac-
of inefficiency of individual rights management. Creators tionnement et propose des solutions devant permettre
could not license, collect and enforce copyright effi- de défragmenter la gestion collective du droit d’auteur.
ciently on an individual basis. Requiring users to obtain The main problem with the collective managementpermission from individual copyright holders for the use of copyright in Canada is fragmentation. Fragmentationof a work was equally inefficient. Collectives, therefore, is a term we use in this paper to refer to the lack ofemerged to facilitate the clearance of rights between cre- cohesion, standardization, and, to a certain extent, effec-ators and users. Even with the facilitation of collectives in tive organization of both copyright law and collectivethe process, clearing rights remains an inherently diffi- management per se. 1 Fragmentation occurs on manycult and convoluted process. This is especially so in the different levels: rights stemming from the law 2age of the Internet where clearing rights for multimedia recognising several economic rights (reproduction, com-products presents new unprecedented challenges. As a munication to the public, adaptation, rental, etc.); 3result of an infelicitous legal evolution and the multipli- within the market structure; within licensing practices;cation of collectives, fragmentation of copyright, and the within a repertory of works; within different marketsway in which it is used and enforced, has occurred. This (language, territory); and through the interoperability ofpaper addresses the problems associated with fragmenta- rights clearance systems. Fragmentation impacts directlytion and offers solutions to ‘‘defrag’’ the collective man- on all affected parties whether they are rightsholders,agement of copyright in Canada. users of copyright works, or regulatory authorities that
oversee the process.
La gestion collective du droit d’auteur au Canada
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, it willétait à l’origine une solution apportée à l’inefficacité de la
explore the history of collective management societiesgestion individuelle des droits. Les créateurs n’étaient pas
(sometimes referred to simply as ‘‘collectives’’); second,en mesure d’octroyer des licences, de percevoir et de
focus on the origin of collective management societiesmettre en œuvre leur droit d’auteur de fa çon
and copyright law in Canada; third, look at the develop-individuelle. Il était tout aussi inefficace d’exiger des utili-
ment of technologies and their intersection with copy-sateurs d’œuvres qu’ils obtiennent des licences de chaque
right law and its management; fourth, examine the ori-ayant droit individuel. Les sociétés de gestion qui ont été
gins of fragmentation and the various problems thatmises sur pied devaient faciliter la gestion des rapports
ensue from the situation; and fifth, look to potentialentre ayants droit et utilisateurs. Mais malgré le rôle joué
solutions to alleviate some of the concerns and chal-par ces sociétés de gestion, l’obtention de autorisation
lenges posed by fragmentation.nécessaires à l’exploitation d’une œuvre prot égée reste
un processus long et alambiqué. Cela est particulière-
ment vrai depuis l’arrivée d’Internet, qui pose des défis
† Osler’s Professor of Technology Law, Faculty of Law (Common Law), University of Ottawa.
‡ LL.M. (Ottawa); Assistant Lecturer, University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law. The authors wish to thank Mr. Mario Bouchard, General Counsel of the































































16 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
considered revolutionary, the pivotal role that they con-International History of
tinue to play as facilitator in the copyright industry isCollective Management Societies 
more properly characterized as evolutionary. Collective
management societies facilitate the establishment of uni-
fied methods for collecting and dispersing royalties asEarly history 
well as negotiating licensing arrangements for works. Yet,
he story of the rise of collective management socie- licensing and royalty payment, while still important, isT ties has become a quaint and famous tale. It begins not the only preoccupation of collective management
with the French playwright Pierre-Augustin Caron de societies. Over time the role of collectives has evolved to
Beaumarchais in the dark and dingy Parisian theatres in oversee copyright compliance, fight piracy and perform
the 1700s. Theatrical companies at the time were enthu- various social and cultural functions. 13
siastic in their encouragement of promoting plays and
Since the inception of collective management socie-artists, but were less generous when it came time to
ties, countries have fostered the growth of such societiesshare in the revenues. The term ‘‘starving artist’’ was
through legislative initiatives in the belief that collectivesmore literal than figurative. 4
offer a viable solution to the problem of individually
Beaumarchais was the first to express the idea of licensing, collecting and enforcing copyright. In theory,
collective rights management. In 1777, he created the collective licensing enables creators to exercise rights in a
General Statutes of Drama in Paris. What began as a fair, efficient and accessible manner. It ensures copyright
meeting of 22 famous writers of the Comédie Française protection when individual management of it becomes
over some financial matters turned into a debate about difficult and often unfeasible from an economic perspec-
collective protection of rights. ‘‘They appointed tive. 14 For example, tens of thousands of radio stations
mandatories (agents), conducted the now famous pen worldwide cannot possibly individually clear the rights
strike and laid a foundation for the French Society of of authors, composers, performers and producers of each
Dramas’ Authors (Société des auteurs dramatiques)’’. 5 In song played.
1838, Honoré de Balzac and Victor Hugo established the
While collective management societies were ini-Society of French Writers6 which was mandated with
tially promoted as an efficient way to collect and dis-the collection of royalties from print publishers.
burse monies to compensate rightsholders for copyright
The net of authors’ societies, shaped by the cultural works, increasingly the structure of collective manage-
environment of each country, slowly spread throughout ment societies, both on a national and international
the world. The collective management of copyright was level, has raised questions about their efficiency.15 In
seen as a practical and efficient way of allowing creators addition to those significant structural issues, the market
to be compensated. In Italy the SIAE, under the direction conditions and business trends of copyright owners are
of Barduzzi, was so efficient that the state also empow- changing, and collectives must adapt. 16 Just as the role of
ered them to collect theatre and cinema taxes. 7 collective management societies is evolutionary, so is
Problems were not limited to the domestic scene, their underlying stated efficiency. 17 While the current
however. As collective management societies flourished milieu of collective management societies may have
in their own national states, the need for cooperation served both creators and users reasonably well in the
and harmonization on the international level became past, the system must adapt to remain both efficient and
apparent. In 1925, Romain Coolus organized the Com- relevant. 18
mittee for the Organization of Congresses of Foreign In recent years, the advent of innovative technolo-
Authors’ Societies. This Committee was founded to gies has forced collectives to grapple with new and
tackle some insurmountable problems involving interna- pressing challenges. Reconciling digital technology with
tional issues. 8 the collective management of copyright, however, has
Around the same time, Firmin Gémier succeeded in not yet posed a problem that cannot be accommodated
creating the Universal Theatrical Society. 9 Both of these within the current framework. Indeed, copyright and the
initiatives led to the founding congress meeting in 1926 collective management of copyright has often been a
of the International Confederation of Societies of response to the introduction of new technologies
Authors (CISAC). 10 The founding members identified whether it is the photocopy machine19 or the VCR or
the need to establish both uniform principles and indeed the Internet. 20 Thus, copyright law and the man-
methods in each country for the collection of royalties agement of copyright are, and will likely remain, in a
and the protection of works, and ensure that literary and state of constant evolution and flux. Like its European
artistic property 11 were recognized and protected and American counterpart, the Canadian experience is a
throughout the world. 12 reflection of such evolution.
The evolving role of copyright collectives 
While the formation of national and international






























































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 17
Prior to the 1988 amendments, the governmentCollective Management Societies
commissioned several reports over a span of some 17in Canada 
years to address what kind of reforms were required.33 A
consensus emerged from these that there was a need to
Origins of collective management extend rights societies to multiple areas of copyright. (In
in Canada particular, the recommendations of the Economic
Council, 34 Keyes and Brunet Report, 35 and the Smithhe birth of copyright law in Canada was first
Report.36)T expressed in a Statute of the Legislature of Lower
Canada in 1832.21 Many intermediary provisions were
In response to new technologies such as theculminated along the way to the official adoption of the
photocopier and cable television, revisions were made toCopyright Act in 1921 but which did not enter into
the law adding rights and introducing new means toforce until 1924. 22 In theory, the Act allowed for the
promote an efficient and robust copyright regime inexistence of musical performing rights societies, however,
Canada. Several amendments were made to the Copy-in practice, only one such musical performing rights
right Act that impacted on collective management socie-society emerged. In 1925, the Canadian Performing
ties and licensing regimes. The first involved the 1988Rights Society (CPRS) was formed as a subsidiary of the
amendments of Bill C-60 37 that modified and intro-British Performing Rights Society (PRS).23 CPRS later
duced provisions relating to collective management soci-became known as the Composers, Authors & Publishers
eties and their regulatory administration. Bill C-60 can-Association of Canada (CAPAC).24 Since its adoption, the
vassed many issues such as the extension of moral rights,Act has been continually amended, most notably in
the imposition of stiffer penalties for piracy, and the1931 to allow CPRS to file tariffs with the Minister, and
establishment of copyright protection for computer pro-in 1936 to permit the control of performing rights socie-
grams. The 1988 amendments also resulted in the Copy-ties, or more accurately, the performing rights society
right Appeal Board becoming the Copyright Board. TheCPRS.25 Thus, the Copyright Appeal Board was estab-
‘‘new’’ Board was endowed with rate-setting authoritylished through the 1936 amendment.
but with little direct authority over the organization,In 1940, another musical performing rights society membership or administration of collective manage-was set up under the name BMI Canada26 which later ment societies.38 Bill C-60 called for the abolition of abecame known as the Performing Rights Organization compulsory licence in sound recordings and introducedof Canada (PROCAN).27 BMI Canada was formed to a definition of ‘‘collective society’’ into the Copyright Act.alleviate concerns that existing societies operated on a The definition, however, was limited to the ‘‘generalrestrictive membership basis making it difficult for other licensing regime’’ as outlined in section 70.1 of the Act.legitimate writers or music publishers to collect music Of particular relevance in these amendments was theroyalties. 28 Furthermore, it was felt that both ASCAP and possibility of establishing new types of copyright collec-CPRS had a limited repertory of music, thus failing to tive management societies other than music performingaddress new forms of music at the time such as jazz and rights societies.country music.29
These two organizations, CAPAC and PROCAN, The second legislative initiative involved the crea-enjoyed a monopoly on both the collective management tion of a retransmission right in 1990 as the result of themusic performance rights, but also, more broadly Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The Free Tradespeaking, they enjoyed a unique and privileged position Agreement recognized the need to regulate televisionas the only existing types of collectives in English and radio signals that spilled over from the United StatesCanada. It was not until 1988, that Canada would see to Canada, and vice versa. The Free Trade Implementa-new collectives enter the scene. 30 And, in 1990, CAPAC tion Act created the right to remuneration for worksand PROCAN, with the encouragement of the Copy- retransmitted on a distant signal by cable and air retrans-right Appeal Board to ‘‘harmonize and uniformize’’ their mission system. Canada accordingly modified the Copy-different tariff structures and in an effort to promote right Act allowing for the establishment of retransmis-efficiency, merged to become SOCAN. 31 sion tariffs which would require approval by the
Copyright Board.39
Calls for reform 
In the 1970s there were calls for revision to the The third reform in 1997 came through Bill C-32.40
Copyright Act. Much of the impetus of this call for The definition of a ‘‘collective society’’ was extended in
change arose from the rapid advances in technology at the Copyright Act to capture a broader range of collec-
the time, particularly in photocopying, audio-visual tive management societies. 41 Bill C-32 further modified
recordings and re-broadcasting of television broadcasts.32 the mandate of the Copyright Board. The Copyright
The use of these technologies stimulated widespread Board was given the additional responsibilities of estab-
interest in extending the concept of performing rights lishing tariffs for ‘‘neighbouring rights’’,42 as well as for





























































18 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
country’s population, with the possible exception ofCurrent regimes of collective management
Brazil. 51 The number of collectives is probably too highThe aforementioned series of amendments resulted
and it seems unlikely that all can survive in a limitedin a multi-tiered legal regime structure for the collective
market. 52 Furthermore, the sheer number of collectivemanagement of copyright: 44
administering bodies in Canada has made it difficult (at
● music performing collectives (and certain least for less seasoned users) to navigate through the
neighbouring rights); maze of organizations in order to use a work.
● retransmission collecting bodies; The number of collective management societies,
however, is only one factor in the problem of rights● general licensing bodies; and
clearance. Indeed, the question must be asked why this
● private copying.
problem has not been raised in the past. The answer lies
The first three types of collectives are subject to in part in the development and use of new digital tech-
varying forms of regulation under the Copyright Act nologies and the growth of multimedia products. As one
although the statutory regime is different for each type. author commented:
Music performing collectives are regulated by The advantage of [collective] systems is clear. Authors and
other rightsowners could never individually control thesections 67–70 of the Copyright Act. The statutory
mass use of their works, at least not in the analogue world.framework for music performing collectives requires col-
Collective management is so often the only means oflectives to file a list of their musical works with the making copyright function at all. In the digital environment,
Copyright Board as well as a statement of proposed tar- however, the co-existence of multiple societies for all dif-
iffs they wish to impose.45 The Copyright Board is ferent types of works could be an obstacle for an efficient
clearing of rights for what is now called, in a mysteriousauthorized to approve the royalties or to make altera-
word, ‘‘multimedia’’, what the Berne Convention simplytions to the proposed rates. 46 In doing so, the Board
calls ‘‘collections’’. 53considers any objections to the proposed tariffs, and is
The clearance of rights for multimedia productsrequired to publish the tariffs once approved.
exposes the existing fragmentation in the collective man-Retransmission collecting bodies are defined in agement of copyright. Not only must users ascertainsection 71 of the Copyright Act. The statutory regime for which of the different rights are in operation, but theyretransmission collecting bodies is different from that of must then ascertain which of the 36 collectives theymusic performing collectives. The Copyright Board has must address in order to clear rights to a work.the authority to approve the proposed statement of tar-
iffs with or without alterations, to consider objections
and to then publish the statements. 47 This regime differs,
however, from the music performing collectives in that Development of the Market 
the Board has the specific power to prescribe, subject to
Cabinet regulations, the manner of determining the
amount of royalties. The Board has further discretionary Economic rationale for collective
power to determine the apportionment of the tariff. management 
General licensing bodies are regulated by sec- ollective management of copyright was promoted
tions 70.1–70.6 of the Copyright Act. The general regime C as an effective way for authors and rightsholders
operates in a sense by way of contractual default. Where such as performers, publishers and producers to monitor
a licensing body or prospective user are unable to agree and, in some cases, control certain uses of their works
on royalties or the terms and conditions for the use of a that would be otherwise unmanageable individually due
work, either party may apply to the Copyright Board to to the large number of users worldwide or due to the
fix the royalties and related terms and conditions. development of new technologies. The use of music for
Private copying is regulated under sections 79–88 broadcast by radio stations is perhaps the best example
of the Copyright Act. This regime is concerned with a of such a use. As already mentioned, thousands of radio
remuneration scheme designed to compensate right- stations worldwide cannot possibly clear individually the
sholders for the use of works that would otherwise be rights for each song they play. Nor would those right-
considered non-infringing under the Copyright Act, the sholders want to receive, and have to respond to, those
private copying of sound recordings. The Copyright individual requests.
Board establishes the levies to be applied to the various Collective management has also allowed authors to
items that fall within the purview of this regime such as use the power of collective bargaining to obtain more for
blank tapes, blank CDs and CD burners. 48 the use of their work and negotiate on a less unbalanced
The C-32 amendments have allowed for the emer- basis with large multinational user groups.54 That being
gence of several new collectives. 49 There are, at the time said, most collective schemes value all works in their
of this writing, some 36 collectives operating in repertory on the same economic footing, which may be
Canada. 50 Canada has the largest number of collective unfair to those who create works that may have a higher






























































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 19
agement ensures that users will have easy access to rights The pervasive nature of the Internet and the
needed to use material protected by copyright. increasing tendency to link various appliances and
devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) and,To a certain extent, collective management societies
soon, television sets and stereo receivers, to the globalfacilitate the market between creators/producers of copy-
network means keeping any material that can be digi-right works, and the users of these works. In some
tized off the Internet will become increasingly difficultrespects, collective management societies can be seen as
— technically, commercially, or both. While a combina-the axel or pivot point on a balanced teeter-totter —
tion of technology and law might allow rightsholders tousers on one side and creators on the other. Once an
keep material off major servers in a number of countriesauthorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the
(though not all countries have copyright laws) and/orpublic, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to
request that Internet service and access providersdetermine what happens to it.
(ISPs/IAPs) block access to (domestic and foreign) WebCollective management societies may be seen as a sites that make possible access to ‘‘pirated’’ material,balancing force between authors and users, 55 but it is user/consumer demand for digital access may ultimatelyimportant they constantly adapt to ensure they are best prevail. Consequently, only rightsholders who are pre-able to facilitate this process. Their continued justifica- pared to meet this demand will survive. 60tion, in some respects, relies on their ability to act as
effective facilitators. Where collective management socie- The fact remains that a large amount of copyright
ties are unable to effectively play this role, and where material is (and more will be) available through digital
they may actually impede or hamper the system by networks and that the ‘‘market’’ will need to be organ-
unreasonably preventing the use of works, a re-evalua- ized in some way. By ‘‘organized’’, we mean that users
tion of both their role and value becomes necessary. will want access and the ability to reuse material law-
Indeed, Théberge56 demands that this issue be brought fully; and rightsholders will be able to meet those needs
to the forefront. in a reasonably efficient way.61 These uses include put-
ting the material on a commercial or educational Web
site or an Intranet, e-mailing it to a group of people,Rationale for collectives in the digital reusing all or part of it to create new copyright material,environment storing it and perhaps distributing on a CD-ROM.
Collectives are now facing the challenges of the dig- Authors and other rightsholders will want to ensure that
ital age. Claims that copyright does not work in the they can put reasonable limits on those uses and reuses
digital age are usually the result of the inability of users and get paid for commercially significant uses of their
to use protected material lawfully. 57 Especially with the material (absent, of course, a specific exemption in the
Internet, users of copyright material can (and want to) Act).
easily access millions of works and parts of works,
It has been argued62 that collective managementincluding government documents, legal, scientific, med-
offers the most workable solutions and best representsical and other professional journals, music, video
key principles of intellectual property amid rapid techno-excerpts, e-books, etc. While digital access is fairly easy
logical advances. Collective management societies mayonce a work has been located (though it may require
be instrumental in facilitating relations between copy-identifying oneself and/or paying for a subscription or
right holders and users of content providing they remainother fee), obtaining the right to use the material beyond
efficient. Their expertise and knowledge of copyright lawits primary use (which is usually only listening, viewing
and management may be essential to make copyrightor reading) is more difficult unless already allowed under
work in the digital age. Under this theory, the individualthe terms of the licence or subscription agreement or as
exercise of rights in the digital environment is renderedan exception to exclusive rights contained in a nation’s
impractical if not futile due to the possibility and ease ofcopyright regime.58
disseminating works. Collectives, therefore, may becomeWhile in some cases, this is the result of the right- critical intermediaries in this process providing they aresholders’ unwillingness to authorize the use — and gen- able to adapt to both the needs and concerns of theerally a legitimate application of their exclusive rights — creators they represent and to the market. Their exper-there are several other cases where it is simply the tise and knowledge of copyright law and managementunavailability of simple, user-friendly licensing that may be viewed as essential to make copyright work inmakes authorized use impossible. Both rightsholders and the digital age. 63users are losers in this scenario: rightsholders because
they cannot provide authorized (controlled) access to On the other hand, it may be that, with the aid of
their works and lose the benefits or orderly distribution technology, the individual exercise of rights will become
of their works, and users because there is no easy author- not only feasible but a more efficient solution, at least in
ized access to the right to reuse digital material. In other certain cases. 64 Thus, it may be the case that the advance-
words, this inability to ‘‘control’’ their works means that ment of new technologies will minimize the role of
these works are simply unavailable (legally) on the collective management societies. Whatever view is taken,






























































20 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
right remains an important task; it may be that collective ates a notion of ‘‘copy’’-right; it is merely illusory. This
management societies need to re-conceptualize their role complicates decisions about how to adapt the copyright
as less aligned with ‘‘collective’’ administration and more framework to merging technologies.
aligned with the ‘‘central’’ administration of facilitating
The history of copyright law is a progression alongrights management.
two axes; first, along a ‘‘work’’ axis, to bring under the
If collective management societies are to play the copyright umbrella new forms of creation (photography,
role of intermediary fully and efficiently, these organiza- cinematography, computer programs); second, along a
tions must acquire the rights they need to license digital ‘‘rights’’ axis, to create rights in respect of new uses of
uses of protected material and build (or improve current) copyright material (radio and television broadcasting,
information systems to deal with ever more complex cable and satellite transmission, now the Internet). 69 Ini-
rights management and licensing tasks. Thus, the ability tially, each type of use fit rather nicely under one right
of collectives to meet the needs of both authors and (or fragment of the copyright ‘‘bundle’’): 70 reproduction
users is dependent on the evolution of both their was the right for books, 71 records and compact discs;
internal practices, and the framework in which collective communication to the public for broadcasters, 72 adapta-
management societies work to alleviate the many con- tion for novels made into movies, etc. But the Internet
cerns of fragmentation within the current system.65 changed all that: making a protected work available on
The problem of rights clearance and the collective an Internet server is a reproduction (on the server) and a
management of copyright in the digital era is not unique communication to the public. 73 Holders of the reproduc-
to Canada. All nations and collective management socie- tion fragment of the copyright bundle in respect of
ties throughout the world are having to adapt their laws musical works are asking for a tariff to be paid because
and infrastructure to meet the challenges of digital tech- broadcasters are making copies that go beyond the
nology and multimedia products. This challenge arises ephemeral recording exception.74 Exceptions to rights
irrespective of the philosophical underpinnings of a are being challenged. 75 Not only can the right be
nation’s copyright system, whether it is rooted in eco- exploited differently, and different fragments grouped
nomic rights, moral rights, utilitarian rights or any com- (‘‘sub-bundles’’), as in the broadcasting and Internet
bination of these. 66 examples above, but each of these ‘‘rights’’ may be fur-
ther subdivided based on the language and the marketThe advent of digital technologies is not to be mis-
where the work will be used. The Act itself recognizestaken for the one and only, or main problem, of the
this subdivision as articulated in section 13(4):collective management of copyright. As we have already
seen, the sheer number of collectives in Canada contrib- The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the
right, either wholly or partially, and either generally or sub-utes greatly to problems of efficient rights clearing.
ject to limitations relating to territory, medium or sector ofMeanwhile, identification of the various rights involved
the market or other limitations relating to the scope of thecoupled with finding the rightsholders associated with assignment, and either for the whole term of the copyright
the underlying rights is perhaps aptly entitled ‘‘organized or for any other part thereof, . . .
chaos’’. 67 The examination of digital technology and the
Clearly, the rights contained in section 3 are norights clearance of multimedia products merely high-
longer useful in mapping out the real world.76 Copyrightlights problems that already exist in the current system.68
fragments have lost their meaning to users and right-An examination of the use of multimedia products and
sholders alike. In actuality, contracts and licensingtheir intersection with collectives allows us to take a
arrangements for copyright works do not usually refer tocloser look at some of the problems of the collective
the specific rights enumerated in this section or if theymanagement of copyright. In this respect, it is like put-
do, it is an afterthought. 77 Contracts define the ‘‘use’’ thatting the cell of a diseased specimen under the lens of a
should be allowed, and not which fragments of rights aremicroscope — while it does not illustrate the entire
needed. This is not borne from any malicious intent butproblem, it allows us to analyze some of the symptoms.
stems from how the rights within a particular market
develop over time, factoring into the equation the evolu-
tion of technology. In the era of the Internet, the use of aFragmentation: The Problem
work (often multimedia) operates in some respects as aUnveiled fiction vis-à-vis the Act. 78 The multimedia work is subdi-
vided into the various components such as a sound, anThe fragmentation of rights image, a photograph, or a software program where rights
opyright, as such, does not exist. In effect, national clearance is required for each consequent subcom-C laws on copyright do not, or no longer, create a ponent. These works are broken down into specific
‘‘copy’’-right. Rather, they outline a collection of rights in rights as defined within the legislation and are often
relation to literary and artistic works which reflect a analogized to other categories within the Act. A mul-
series of acts requiring authorization from the right- timedia work, for example, under Canadian law is a
sholder. Canadian copyright law is not an exception to ‘‘compilation’’ while a software program is a ‘‘literary






























































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 21
tably have a producer to contend with as well. One ofThe fragmentation of clearance processes 
these rightsholders has died and the rights to the musicalThe changes previously outlined pose significant
work are now in the deceased’s estate — this particularproblems for rights clearance because, as the division of
rightsholder has four heirs. For our opening theme song,tasks among the fragments is becoming progressively
we have decided to commission an original musicalobsolete (at least for newer uses), collective administra-
work which will involve a composer, performers and ation is still organized around such fragments. SOCAN
producer. The use of these musical works in our film willhas the right of communication to the public, while
in turn lead to the soundtrack for ‘‘The Big Bundle’’.SODRAC, CMRRA, CANCOPY and COPIBEC have the
As we shoot our film, various set designs are built.rights of reproduction (for musical and textual works,
We may wish to display artwork or photographs to setrespectively). Hence, even when efficient systems are
the ambiance for a scene in which case the artists and/oravailable, rights clearance may prove a difficult task.
art owners will need to be contacted. One scene will beThe inherent difficulty in rights clearance is perhaps
shot in a park with a statue. Permission to film the statuebest illustrated by way of an example, showing that the
within the scene must be obtained. Or perhaps we willprocess often involves multiple layers of rights, and
have a scene where our characters rent a movie, and weclearing each of these rights can be a labyrinthine pro-
wish to show two minutes of footage from this film,cess (even if each such process is in itself efficient). This
leading to yet another rights clearance transaction.may be analogized to a maze whose point of entry and
While in search for the perfect location for specificexit are challenging to find, and where the path to com-
scenes, we have decided to shoot ‘‘The Big Bundle’’ inpletion remains filled with obstacles and hurdles. Now
Canada and France. Different issues and rights will needimagine not one maze but three additional mazes
to be cleared according to the laws and contractualstacked on top: the copyright works (or substantial parts
agreements negotiated in each of these nations. In addi-of works) used the subdivision of rights within such
tion to the number of varying rights and rightsholders inwork, the various rightsholders associated with each of
each of these nations, each nation will also have its ownthose rights, and the particulars of each market/territory
unique system of rights clearance which may or may notwhere the rights must be cleared. Because rights owner-
involve anywhere from one collective society andship and licensing arrangements change through time,
upwards to an almost unlimited amount.our maze becomes more like a four-dimensional matrix.
As our film is being made, new rights and right-Take for example the making of a film. The founda-
sholders emerge. For example, under French law, ourtion dimension of the matrix would consist in identi-
director has an unwaivable and non-transferrable rightfying and clearing the rights for the various types of
to remuneration for several forms of exploitation of theworks within the film. We will call this the ‘‘big bundle’’
film in France, including video rentals.80 Meanwhile, weof rights. The works in question could include the
may have to contend with guilds when dealing with anyscreenplay, the book which the screenplay was based on,
potential rights that our actors and writers may acquirethe musical works incorporated in the film, any art or
in our production, and, if we choose to involve actorsphotographs used in the setting, as well as the end
from the countries that we are shooting in, perhaps dif-product of the film itself. Each of the works in this ‘‘big
ferent national guilds or collectives. Likewise we, thebundle’’ may in turn involve several different rights,
studio/producer, will acquire rights in our film, either asrightsholders, and systems of rights clearance which
full copyright or, as in Europe, a neighbouring right ascomprise the remaining three layers in our four-dimen-
producers of the ‘‘first fixation’’ of the audiovisualsional matrix.
work.81Let us now turn our attention to making our film
Once our film is made, we will have to resolvewhich we will call, ‘‘The Big Bundle’’, based on the book
issues of distribution. Different cinema companies willtitled, ‘‘Bundling’’. To use this book, we will require
have to be negotiated with for the right to distribute andauthorization from both the author and the publisher.
play ‘‘The Big Bundle’’. Our film will eventually beOnce we have acquired the rights to the book ‘‘Bun-
released on video and possibly later broadcast over televi-dling’’, we turn our attention to making a screenplay
sion, and perhaps cable and satellite. The situation isbased on the book. We hire an American screenwriter to
further complicated by the fact that separate distributioncreate the script for ‘‘The Big Bundle’’. Afterwards, we
agreements will need to be negotiated on a per countrymay have to comply with the rules and regulations of the
basis. And, as indicated above, each element of thisScreenwriters’ Guild.79
puzzle, including copyright transfers, may changeWe must now consider the musical works that we
through time.will use in our film. Several musical works have been
selected to accompany scenes throughout our movie. We The four-dimensional rights matrix is complex,
must obtain authorization for each musical work. Some posing several challenges in the production of our film.
of the songs have been written and performed by the Each work we wish to use is exploited in a unique way,
same composer while others have separate composers, thus different types of works are often subject to a sepa-
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stances, rights clearance will have to be negotiated with amongst collective management societies would lead to
the applicable collective society; finding which collective greater efficiencies and alleviate some of the fragmenta-
society has acquired the right to administer and nego- tion under the current system. To play that role fully and
tiate on behalf of the rightsholder is another matter alto- efficiently, however, these organizations must acquire the
gether. One collective society may represent a creator for rights they need to license digital uses of protected mate-
part of her repertoire, and another collective for the rial and build (or improve current) information systems
remainder. 82 Likewise, each different type of work, to deal with ever more complex rights management and
whether it is rights to a sound recording or the rights to a licensing tasks. Additionally, collective management soci-
screenplay, will inevitably involve multiple collective eties will need to organize and cooperate fully, both on a
management societies, multiple rightsholders, and national and international scale to achieve their role as
numerous rights stemming from the works of these facilitators of rights clearance. The following suggestions
rightsholders. Again, all of this varies over time as legisla- are offered as potential means to achieve this goal.
tion, practices and the factual situations presented in this
example constantly change. The fragmentation within Technology the system is complex: different works are exploited in a
Technology and, in particular, electronic rightsvariety of ways while each of these works involves mul-
management systems,86 are a useful tool in copyrighttiple rights, rightsholders, systems of rights clearance, and
clearance, especially in the digital environment. Tomarkets. Fragmentation is all-pervasive. The hurdles in
borrow from our four-dimensional matrix, such technol-weaving our way through this rights clearance matrix are
ogies would operate like a joystick to a videogame. Theperplexing at best, insurmountable at worst.
joystick is a mechanism of control — it facilitates rightsHow does one simplify the system? Is it possible to
clearance in that it aids the user in jumping over hurdlesshrink the four-dimensional matrix into a single-layered
steering them towards proper identification of the right-maze? What tools may be developed to aid in hurdling
sholders involved and the rights that will need to beobstacles along the way? Should a centralized ‘‘informa-
cleared. While it does not guarantee the success of thetion booth’’ be set up at the entranceway to guide users
player, the joystick greatly increases the likelihood ofthrough the maze? Will some form of standardization be
successfully navigating through the matrix.sufficient or is a new approach to copyright altogether
Before we can understand electronic copyrightrequired?
management systems, we need to understand the con-
cepts that underlie such systems from a more technical
perspective, starting with ‘‘rights management’’ itself.Defragging the System Copyright management systems (CMS) are basically
databases that contain information about contentarious clearance systems are based on sometimes
(works, discrete manifestations of works and relatedV obsolete fragments, each with its own idiosyncra-
products) and, in most cases, the author and other right-sies. This means that even if each such ‘‘sub-system’’ (for
sholders. 87 That information is needed to support thea clearance process requiring several clearance transac-
process of authorizing the use of those works by others.tions performed through different intermediaries,
A CMS thus usually involves two basic modules, one forincluding several collectives) is efficient, efficiency of the
the identification of content and rightsholders, the otherprocess as a whole is in jeopardy. When applied to the
for licensing (or, rarely, for other rights transactions, suchInternet, the very mechanisms in place for rights clear-
as a full assignment). In many cases, ancillary modulesance become part of the equation when building an
such as payment or accounts receivable are also consid-efficient business model. In other words, collective man-
ered part of the system, but the core of a CMS is contentagement is not a neutral service. Given the fragility of
and rights identification coupled with a licensing tool.Internet-based business models for delivery of copyright
content on the Internet, 83 it is worth asking whether A copyright management system can be used by
such influence is positive, especially in light of the fact individual rightsholders or by third parties who manage
that it follows from the application of legacy systems and rights on behalf of others. A rightsholder might use the
regulations that were never intended for a network tech- system to track a repertory of works or products embod-
nology such as the Internet. Economically efficient clear- ying such works (or substantial parts thereof), or an
ance ‘‘should ensure that copyright administration organization representing a group of rightsholders might
favours no one delivery method over another’’. 84 use a CMS to track each rightsholder’s rights and works.
Such an organization might be a literary agent repre-Many collective management organizations may be
senting a number of writers, or, more commonly, a col-critical intermediaries in the process of organizing new
lective management society.markets and in making improvements to the existing
system. Their expertise and knowledge of copyright law Applying the above concepts, it is easy to see that
and management may be essential to make copyright rights management functions are made much easier
work in the digital age.85 Regardless of whether digital with computers, which can act both as huge rights






























































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 23
ized systems allow rightsholders to automatically grant online multimedia licensing system operated jointly by
licences to users without human intervention, which has all Canadian collectives does not currently seem justified
the benefit of keeping transaction costs low and making either by current licensing practices or by prevailing
licensing an efficient, Internet-speed process: licences to market conditions. To go back to our matrix, ECMS are
use a specific work can be granted online, 24 hours a akin to both a tool to aid in hurdling obstacles and, at
day, to individual users. Ideally, such licences will be the same time, act as an information booth, identifying
tailored to a user’s needs.88 For example, a corporation rights and then directing users to rightsholders. 93
may want to post a flattering newspaper article on its The sheer number of collectives in Canada, which
Web site or send it via email to its customer base; an surpasses the number of similar organizations in almost
individual author may decide to purchase the right to any other country (even those with far higher population
use an image, video clip, or song to use in her/his own levels), 94 potentially poses a problem for establishing
creative process; a publishing house might purchase the ECMS. It is not economically feasible to build an inte-
right to reuse previously published material. Electronic grated rights management system for each of them.
Copyright Management Systems (ECMS) may also be Clearly, some collectives have rights management needs
used to deliver content in cases where the user does not that can be met with a very basic infrastructure. As a rule,
have access to such content in the required format. Or, however, to offer online services and deal with online
they may be used to create licensing sites or offer users and usage, including rights management informa-
licensing options at the point where the content is made tion, an efficient system is required. That does not mean
available. Finally, digital technology can also be used to that to perform other functions, the fractioning of the
track usage (‘‘metering’’ and ‘‘monitoring’’), look for ‘‘CMO market’’ in Canada is necessarily counter-produc-
unauthorized online uses (programs known as ‘‘spiders’’ tive. In order to implement an efficient system, collec-
or ‘‘bots’’ that scour the Web looking for unauthorized tives should cooperate within appropriate groupings (i.e.,
copies of material on Web sites) or to encrypt material in CMO’s having a sufficient degree of commonality) to
digital containers to limit further uses of the material. limit the number of rights management systems to be
developed and they should develop compatible systemsFor transactional (case-by-case) licences, an ECMS
to ensure that the exchange of data will be possible. 95thus basically acts as a licensing engine. There are various
implementations of such systems that range in technical To be able to licence quickly and efficiently online,
sophistication from the very basic to the very complex an ECMS is indispensable. But, under the current struc-
(and expensive). Using an ECMS, the user can search ture of collective rights management in Canada, an
available content and rights online, submit a licence ECMS does not in and by itself solve the problem of
request online and receive a response from the system. A fragmentation; it only assures that the fragment covered
variation on this theme is where the user first locates the by the ECMS in question is managed efficiently.
content (using a search engine or portal) and is then
offered licensing options at the point of content. 89
Extended collective licensing To protect content on the Internet, a number of
The extended collective licence is used in all Nordic‘‘rights management systems’’ are now combined with
countries. It is a voluntary assignment or transfer oftechnology that prevents reuse of online content (except
rights from rightsholders to the collective with a legalas authorized at the time the content was acquired). 90
extension of the repertoire to encompass the non-This may take the form of a ‘‘container’’ in which digital
member rightsholders, thus simplifying and makingcontent is delivered and/or a watermark to track content
more effective the acquisition of rights. Some call it aposted on (publicly-available) Web sites. The protection
‘‘backup legal licence’’, but this expression may be con-technology checks for authorization before providing
fusing since the rightsholder can choose to opt out of theaccess to the protected content or allowing the user to
system. This, of course, is not possible under a compul-make or send a copy. 91 Whether these systems succeed
sory (also known as legal) licence. 96as intermediaries will ultimately depend on users’ reac-
tion and acceptance level. The negative reaction to the Extended collective licensing may be an appropriate
industry’s offering of such services in the post-Napster and effective method in facilitating rights clearance.
era shows that users will not easily accept stringent con- Extended collective licensing could be considered in the
trols. 92 next phase of reform of the Copyright Act, but only for
‘‘general regime’’ collectives and only in respect to pub-In order to be optimally efficient and deal with
lished works, thus excluding rights such as music per-digital usage information, online member and work
formance, which have a special regime under the Act. 97registration, user requests and online transactional
licensing (where such licensing on reasonably standard The extended collective licence works as follows: as
terms is possible), collective management societies need soon as a considerable (or substantial) number of right-
a rights management system with both an efficient sholders in a given category agree to join forces in a
‘‘back-end’’ system and a user-friendly online interface collective, the repertoire of the appropriate collective is
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rightsholders in the same category but also to all relevant create new works rather than obtaining permission to
foreign rightsholders. The licence also extends to use existing copyright works. 99 A new blanket licence
deceased rightsholders, particularly in cases where estates could operate on the level of ‘‘uses’’. In other words, fees
have yet to be properly organized. for the use of a work would be determined based on the
actual use of a work, and not based on the negotiatedThe extended collective licence is an interesting
term set by each collective society.model for countries like Canada where, on the one
hand, rightsholders are reasonably well organized and
This solution has the advantage of being fairer toinformed, and, on the other hand, a great part of the
users and potentially achieves administrative efficienciesmaterial that is the object of licences comes from foreign
for both creators and users. Such a system would becountries. It is often more difficult and time-consuming
fairer to users in that there would no longer be a discrep-to obtain an authorization for the use of foreign material.
ancy in fees to be paid for similar uses of a work.100The extended collective licence provides a legal solution
Administrative efficiencies, on the other hand, resultto this situation, as the agreements struck between users
from each and every collective having to file tariffs to beand rightsholders will include all non-excluded domestic
approved by the Copyright Board. 101 This would requireand foreign rightsholders.
changes to the current law but would allow for more
Finally, by accelerating the acquisition of rights, the efficient uses of the Board’s resources, and would be a
extended collective licence also increases the efficiency significant tool to users in clearing rights
and promptness of royalties’ collection. The monies
redistributed to rightsholders are thereby increased. In essence, a single tariff (and cheque) could be
An extended collective licence is, however, of lim- established for different types or uses of works. This
ited application. Such licences alleviate the specific frag- would require a more proactive approach on the part of
mentation problem of acquiring authorized access to the Copyright Board, but it is not unprecedented.102 In
works of non-members of a collective but they do not this sense, the user would pay an admission fee at the
address the seemingly larger problems associated with entrance to the matrix and those at the ticket booth
fragmentation. Furthermore, such a collective licensing would identify rightsholders and disperse cheques to the
regime is limited to collectives operating under the ‘‘gen- varying collective management societies. This would not
eral regime’’. To draw upon our matrix image, an require the law to be changed but could require a cen-
extended collective licence effectively removes some of tralized administrative regime to disperse the cheques.
the obstacles in rights clearance but it is a specific solu- Though a centralized administrative agency may be the
tion aimed at a specific problem. key to the success of such a system, it should be noted
that it would not necessarily be required. The money
could simply be put in one pot, and in order to draw
money from the pot, collective management societiesCombined multiple licences assessed by
would have to cooperate in order to ascertain whocomponent uses would get what. The Copyright Board could simply elect
A multiple blanket licence would present an alter- not to approve tariffs filed by collective management
native solution. The two most relevant uses of such societies, requiring them to modify the fees to a set stan-
licences are where there are inherent difficulties in dard.
advanced clearance of rights, and where consolidation is
more practical from a user’s (and sometimes creator’s) This solution is somewhat coercive; it would force
perspective. From a functional point of view, collective collective management societies to cooperate with one
management societies were seen as a practical substitute another in order to receive monies. But such ‘‘umbrella’’
for a blanket licence due to the multitude of uses and collectives already exist to receive monies from users that
the difficulty of advance clearance. 98 Forcing users to go are then redistributed to the member collectives, who in
through a collective society to obtain authorization for turn distribute to their members. The best examples are
the use of a work as opposed to dealing with right- the Private Copying Collective of Canada (CPCC) and
sholders on an individual level was seen as a necessary the Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada
process. It may be the case, however, that with mul- (NRCC). 103
timedia works, a blanket licence may be a more appro-
priate response. While this solution would appear to have many
While collective management societies lessen the benefits, the downside is that not all collectives may be
difficulties of advanced clearance, the issue of advanced willing to cooperate voluntarily with one another. It may
clearance for multiple rights or media forms requires turn out that more inefficiencies and battles over money
additional solutions. Clearing countless rights for mul- are created. Such an outcome would not address the
timedia products is a cumbersome procedure. Some difficulties for users to obtain advance clearing of rights
multimedia producers have stated that they would nor would such a solution necessarily rid the system of































































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 25
of information. It is sometimes referred to as a ‘‘one-stop-Exemptions of Acts and compulsory
shop’’ service (or ‘‘guichet unique’’).licensing 
This solution allows us to draw a crucial distinction The centralized licensing agency acts as an informa-
between two legislative tools at Parliament’s disposal. tion booth or a service counter. Users can then obtain all
First, the government may take away the rights of needed licences at the same time and place. The advan-
authors entirely, by exempting certain acts that would tage of this system is that users are saved from the
otherwise require an authorization from the author. Per- onerous task of identifying rightsholders and then
haps the best example is the inclusion of those acts into clearing rights involved through multiple agents. Ideally,
the fair dealing sphere although there are other types of a centralized licensing agency would utilize an electronic
exemptions in the Act. 105 In other cases, the government rights management system to aid in this process but it is
may decide that it would be impractical or unfair to important to realize that the use of such a technology is
require that an authorization be obtained and impose a not itself representative of a centralized scheme — more
compulsory licence: a work covered by a compulsory changes are needed.112
licence may be used without authorization, provided the
In Europe, problems of fragmentation and the chal-tariff (if any) set by the Copyright Board is paid.
lenge of licensing multimedia products are beingThere is, however, a fundamental difference
addressed both at the different national and interna-between these two tools. In one case, the author or other
tional governmental levels. 113 New rights clearance cen-rightsholders might argue (assuming copyright is a prop-
tres have been established in many countries on theerty right) that they are expropriated without compensa-
national level, but a central clearance centre for all oftion (though ostensibly in the public interest). Users
Europe has yet to emerge. A common characteristic ofmight argue that in such a case the copyright monopoly
these clearance centres is that the multimedia produceris simply not extended into areas where it does not
can clear all rights for a project by stopping and shop-belong; their claim is usually that they need to access
ping at one single centre. Several countries have imple-and use a work lawfully and that in certain cases,
mented ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ centres.114obtaining a licence is either impossible or completely
impracticable. 106 When a compulsory licence is in place, The European Commission also funded 10 pilot
these ‘‘obstacles’’ are removed and the issue then boils projects on multimedia rights clearance systems:
down to whether the authors and other rightsholders INDECS,115 EFRIS, 116 TV FILES,117 PRISAM,118 ORS,119
should be financially compensated. BONA FIDE,120 b (before copyright), 121 COMPAS122
RCTRIDW 123 and VERDI. 124 The VERDI projectA serious obstacle to the establishment of a new
attracted much attention. The aim of the VERDI projectcompulsory licence or exemption is that it must be
was to build an infrastructure to licence use of mul-allowed under the Berne Convention for the Protection
timedia content for European users and rightsholders.of Literary and Artistic Works, 107 to which Canada is
party, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
A ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ multimedia clearance centre hasIntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 108 administered by
also been started in Japan. For example, the Japan Copy-the World Trade Organization (WTO) and subject to
right Information Service Center (J-CIS) contains athe WTO’s binding dispute-settlement system.109 There
database that provides users with information aboutare very few cases where such compulsory licensing or
copyrights in multiple fields, but it does not yet go as farexemption would be possible. There is no such limita-
as handling rights clearance. 125 Japan is also the home oftion on, for example, using extended collective licensing,
the Copymart project launched several years ago by Pro-provided rightsholders can opt out of the scheme and
fessor Zentaro Kitagawa.126 Copymart is a highly flexiblecontinue to manage their rights individually. 110
system allowing rightsholders (or their representatives)
and users to ‘‘meet’’ electronically. Users can then obtain
a licence based on their needs. 127Centralized licensing agents 
Centralized licensing must be distinguished from Meanwhile, voluntary licensing of digital uses by
collective licensing. Collective licensing, as in the case of collective management societies is already in place in the
Canada, typically involves the establishment of a collec- United States. ASCAP and BMI, the two U.S. performing
tive society for the administration of a specific right such rights collectives, have tariffs relating to the public per-
as mechanical rights or reproduction rights, on behalf of formance of music on the Internet. Copyright Clearance
rightsholders. The collective aspect is formed through Centre (CCC) licenses reproduction of printed material
the coming together of rightsholders within a particular for inclusion in ‘‘digital coursepacks’’, reuse of material
domain whereby the collective society negotiates and on Web sites, intranets, CD-ROMs and other digital
administers the clearance and use of rights for a set fee.111 media. CCC also offers a repertory-based licence for
Centralized licensing, on the other hand, is the aggrega- internal digital reuse of material by corporate users.
tion of collective management societies into an umbrella Interestingly, in the latter program, users can only scan
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digital form.128 CCC’s ability to license digital uses is It may be the case that in Canada, one or two
entirely based on voluntary and non-exclusive rights collective management societies are best suited to pro-
transfers from rightsholders. vide centralized licensing services, and that an entirely
new agent would not need to be created.139 Again, theThe ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ clearance centres greatly facili-
more important question is whether such an arrange-tate rights clearing with multimedia products and are
ment will evolve ‘‘naturally’’ or whether a legislativeseen as a solution originating with the market. 129 Central
impetus will be necessary.licensing has been heralded an efficient way of rights
clearance for both collective society members and
users. 130 Central licensing, however, is not a solution free Standard form contracts and coalitions 
of criticism. These central licensing agents are adminis-
Multilateral agreements between collective manage-tered on a national basis; coordination on a European
ment societies represent another potential solution.and an international basis remains largely unexplored.131
Referring to our matrix example, collective managementThe extent of collaboration and standardization, there-
societies would set up agreements with one another tofore, is somewhat restricted to the domestic market. Fur-
set standards and establish cooperative compensatorythermore, there are concerns that users will begin to
regimes, so that a user could approach any of these socie-‘‘shop’’ deals — advantageous for users but potentially
ties and obtain the information necessary to clear thedisadvantageous for creators. As one author notes:
right to use a work. They would not have to go from
A deeper tension lies between some of the European point to point in search of the relevant information. Thiscollecting societies themselves all intent on being the one to
is best characterized as a standardization effort.offer the one stop license and as this power struggle is
played out, the situation has arose that it now becomes A useful example of such a system is the administra-
possible to shop around the various territories to get the best tion of mechanical rights in Europe. Centralizedrates and widest territorial licenses. All of this in front of the
licensing regimes on a European-wide (and to a certainbackdrop of the failure to conclude a memorandum of
extent worldwide) basis are prevalent within the field ofunderstanding between collecting societies and rights
owners for either international or European-wide on-line mechanical rights. The Bureau International des Sociétés
licensing and question . . . of who licenses whom.132 Gérant les Droits D’Enregistrement et de Reproduction
Finally, pre-clearance of rights on a transactional Mécanique (BIEM) and the International Federation of
basis at a one-stop-shop is a fairly complex, long and the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) were formed as interna-
expensive process even when done through an efficient tional organizations that group societies for the purpose
ECMS and even with the added benefit of having a of effective and efficiently administrating mechanical
single point of departure in the rights maze. It may work rights. 140
for professional users seeking to create a CD-ROM, but BIEM is a confederation or a ‘‘super society’’ of over
in its current form and application, is much less viable 40 mechanical rights organizations from over 30 coun-
for mass market uses. 133 tries throughout the world. 141 BIEM is responsible for
This also begs the question of whether the acquisi- negotiating the terms of a general licensing system for
tion and management of (multimedia) rights should be the reproduction of musical works on sound recordings
facilitated by legislative or contractual mechanisms. A with IFPI. The licensing arrangements are then adminis-
market solution may not be the most efficient or feasible tered by member organizations of BIEM in their respec-
solution. On the other hand, an overriding central tive territories. This arrangement is aligned with a cen-
licensing system may require legislative backing.134 tralized licensing arrangement. However, these
arrangements were not as harmonized as one mightThe workability of a central licensing agency or
expect. The licensing arrangements varied in terms ofone-stop-shop multimedia clearance centre in Canada
national and international repertoire covered, duration,remains an attractive solution. It must be noted, how-
and discounts on royalties to the record companies. 142ever, that licensing of digital uses has in fact begun.
This led to dissatisfaction of many music producers andSOCAN filed a tariff for the public performance of
record companies who began to challenge the authoritymusic (known as ‘‘Tariff 22’’) and the Copyright Board
of many collective management societies, and to therendered a ‘‘Phase I’’ decision on legal issues,135 which
individual negotiation of contracts. 143was modified by the Federal Court of Appeal, 136 a deci-
sion now before the Supreme Court. 137 SODRAC and Furthermore, the success of BIEM is largely contin-
CMRRA have also filed tariffs concerning the reproduc- gent on negotiations for the renewal of the BIEM/IFPI
tion of music in Internet transmissions and NRCC with Standard Contract which the two organizations nego-
respect to the neighbouring rights involved in the trans- tiate every four to five years. This Standard Contract
mission. 138 While these initiatives are important, they fall forms the basis for reciprocal agreements between socie-
shy of implementing a centralized licensing system that ties. 144 The last round of negotiations in 1997 at the
would truly constitute a ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ environment MIDEM Conference between BIEM and IFPI generated
for users. An overarching system is required which disagreement in positions between the two groups. This,
would incorporate all collective management societies in turn, resulted in a stalemate in the process; based on































































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 27
ties sought to maximize the compensation to music cre- According to one theory, what are important are
ators and publishers while the phonographic societies distribution rights. This is perhaps mostly amply illus-
sought to reduce such costs. trated in the following passage:
After experiencing an impasse in negotiations for . . . the fundamental right granted by copyright is the right of
reproduction — of making copies. Indeed the very wordthe better part of a year, and after more than a year of
‘‘copyright’’ appears to signify that the right to control cop-operating under the conditions of an expired contract,
ying must be fundamental part of any system of copyrightan agreement regarding the terms to constitute a new . . . The advent of digital documents has illuminated this
Standard Contract between BIEM and IFPI was signed. issue: In the digital realm, copying is not a good predictor of
The contract was to be executed with effect from July 1, intent to infringe; moreover, copying of digital works is
necessary for normal use of those works. We argue that the1997 through June 30, 2000.145 This contract, known as
right to control copying should be eliminated as anthe ‘‘Cannes Agreement’’, involved two essential ele-
organizing principle of copyright law. In its place, we pro-ments: the mechanical rights societies agreed not only to pose as an organizing principle the right to control public
reduce overall commission rates taken on phono- distribution of the copyrighted work. 151
mechanical royalty income but also to introduce an ele-
Other proposals, applicable only to the Internet, arement of transparency to their procedure. 146
to create a ‘‘right of computer network transmission’’152In the spirit of previously negotiated contracts
or to replace copyright with a broad levy on blankbetween BIEM and IFPO, new coalitions and efforts are
media. 153 This could be helpful if such right combinedbeing made in the exploitation and administration of
and/or replaced all existing fragments, not if added as anmultimedia rights. For example, some major players of
additional one. 154the music industry (BIEM, CISAC, IFPI, and RIAA) are
working together on a project to develop a global identi- Others have focused on transforming copyright into
fication scheme for digital music content. 147 A similar a ‘‘use’’ right, which could be limited to commercially
scheme has been developed to identify motion pic- significant uses, especially unauthorized uses that lead to
tures. 148 loss of revenue for rightsholders. 155 A reform of the list of
fragments of the copyright bundle contained in section 3While the promulgation of standard form contracts
of the Act would start from the premise that such rightsis an appealing solution, it is premised on voluntary
do not correspond to actual uses, which are often mini-association. It is a matter of conceptualization at one
bundles of many of the listed rights. 156level, and practical reality at the other. Should collective
management societies form such arrangements and take While the soil is perhaps not yet ripe to completely
the initiative to establish centralized licensing regimes, revamp copyright law at this point, it is important to
then other solutions may not be required. The current recognize the growing discourse in this area.
reality, however, is that this is not occurring in Canada,
therefore, perhaps legislative or governmental involve-
ment is required.
Conclusion International centralized licensing system 
The point may be made that any reformation to the ollective management societies may be justified
structure of collective management societies on a C only so far as the level of quality of services is
national level is an incomplete solution. Some would acceptable and efficient, thereby taking into account the
argue that an international collective society is administrative technologies available. Thus, in its incep-
required.149 One argument in favour of this solution is tion, collective management societies developed out of
that while rights may be owned on a national basis, they necessity; it was not feasible for authors and publishers
do not necessarily need to be managed on a national to maintain a direct relationship with users. In the
basis. In the digital era, the latter point is amplified. But advent of new technologies, however, authors and pub-
the creation of an international centralized licensing lishers may be able to initiate and maintain a direct
system is, to a certain extent, somewhat beyond the relationship with users. While this does not necessarily
scope of this paper and perhaps beyond the scope of a abolish altogether the role of collective management
realistic solution.150 societies, it highlights the need to reform the existing
collective society structure in order to justify their con-
Revamping copyright tinued existence on one level, and to alleviate the
The most radical solution and one requiring a rich emerging problems of fragmentation. This is not to say
and complex analysis, but one which is mostly outside of that the role of collective management societies is dimin-
the scope of this paper, is to literally scrap ‘‘copy’’-right ishing. It is that their role is changing. There is a similar
law altogether. The argument is that in the advent of motif that runs through each of the outlined solutions:
digital technology, it may be that to speak of copyright in that some form of centralization and standardization is
terms of rights associated with ‘‘copying’’ a work is a an absolute prerequisite to efficiency, particularly in the
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Notes:
1 Fragment or fragmentation is derived from the Latin adjective ‘‘fractus’’. the point is that new technologies alleviate some concerns of inefficiency
According to Benoit Mandelbrot, ‘‘The corresponding Latin verb related to individually licensing, collecting and enforcing copyright.
‘frangere’ means ‘to break’: to create irregular fragments. It is therefore 19 The notion of contributory/secondary infringement was introduced to
sensible — and . . . appropriate . . . that, in addition to ‘fragmented’, fractus copyright regimes as a deterrent to third parties such as copy centres and
should also mean ‘irregular,’ both meanings being preserved in fragment.’’ shops from unlawfully reproducing copyright works.
The notion of fragments is a component to chaos theory. For an explana-
20 As H. Cohen Jehoram notes:tion of chaos theory and for further examples of Benoit Mandelbrot’s
work in the area see Manus J. Donahue III, ‘‘An Introduction to Mathe- Photocopying machines were only a new technique and copyright
matic Chaos Theory and Fractal Geometry,’’ online: Duke University itself was the child of technology, of the most fundamental revolu-
Homepage: http://www.duke.edu/~mjd/chaos/chaos.html (date accessed: tion in information technology, Gutenberg’s invention of movable
14 January 2003). type. Copyright could in the long run only profit from developing
means of exploiting works, despite the other side of the coin, that2 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [hereinafter the ‘‘Act’’].
some new infringing practices of users could not be stopped. But3 The Act, supra note 2 at s. 3. then copyright has never been a watertight system. If the lack
4 While this may be an exaggeration on the authors’ part, this cliché thereof was to be called a crisis, then copyright has always been in
remains, nonetheless, a somewhat accurate portrait of financially strug- crisis. Exactly the same could be said with respect to the dangers for
gling artists both then and now. copyright in the digital age.
5 CPTech’s Page on Collective Management of Copyrights, online: Home See H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘‘The Future of Copyright Collective Socie-
Page of Consumer Project on Technology: http://www.cptech.org/cm/ ties’’ (2001) E.I.P.R. 134.
copyrights.html (date accessed: 14 January 2003). 21 Keyes & Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the6 La Société des Gens de Lettres Homepage: http://www.sgdl.org/fr_his.htm Law (Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1977) at 5.
(date accessed: 14 January 2003). 22 The Act, supra note 2.7 For a complete historical account of the formation of collective manage- 23 J. Matejcek, History of BMI Canada Ltd. and PROCAN and their role inment societies, see International Confederation of Societies of Authors and
Canadian music in 1940–1990 (Toronto, 1995) at 2.Composers, As Long as There are Authors (Paris: General Secretariat of the
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, 24 CPRS came to be called CAPAC in 1945.
1996). 25 Copyright Board Annual Report 1998–1999, at 7.
8 As one commentator noted: 26 BMI Canada was a subsidiary of Broadcast Music, Inc, a U.S. collective
The Portuguese Society of Authors offered to represent French created by users (broadcasters) to manage composers’ rights and compete
authors, and the theater managers of Lisbon immediately with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
threatened to boycott French plays. The Spanish society SGAE (ASCAP). See online: BMI http://www.bmi.com (date accessed: 14 Jan-
would not allow the SACD to deal with its members on an indi- uary 2003) and online: The American Society of Composers, Authors and
vidual basis. (Ibid. at 10.) Publishers http://www.ascap.com (date accessed: 14 January 2003).
9 The biography of Firmin Gémier may be found (in French) Odeon The- 27 P. Grant, ‘‘Competition and the Collectives in Canada: New Develop-
atre de Europe, online: http://www.theatre-odeon.fr/public/document/ ments in the Relationship between Copyright and Antitrust Law,’’
biograph/gemier.htm (date accessed: 14 January, 2003). (1990–91) 1 M.C.L.R. 191 at 192.
10 The International Confederation of Societies of Authors online: http:// 28 J. Matejcek, supra note 23 at 3.
www.cisac.org (date accessed: 14 January, 2003). 29 Ibid.11 The French law on authors’ rights (the civil law version of copyright) is 30 The situation in Québec may be differentiated with the rest of Canada.actually known as the Code of Literary and Artistic Property (Law
Collectives outside of the realm of music performing were established.No. 92–597 of July 1, 1992, as amended by Laws Nos. 94–361 of May 10,
The validity of their legal status, however, was uncertain. They were in1994, and 95–4 of January 3, 1995).
some ways akin to labour groups in their fight to establish rights. The12 By ‘‘world’’ we are only referring to the Western world. This is inclusive legal status of collectives was not confirmed until the 1988 Amendments
of the Anglo-Saxon and droit d’auteur traditions of copyright. to the Copyright Act.
13 See M. Ficsor, Collective Administration of Copyright and Neighboring 31 J. Matejcek, supra note 23 at 95–124.
Rights (Geneva: WIPO, 1990) at 80–83.
32 D. Smith, Collective Agencies for Administration of Copyright (Con-14 This is stated quite clearly in Article 1 of the Statutes of the International sumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1983) at 1.Federation of Reproduction Rights Societies (IFRRO): ‘‘Collective or cen-
33 See for example: M. Berthiaume & J. Keon, The Mechanical Reproduc-tralized management is preferable where the individual exercise of rights
tion of Musical Works in Canada (Consumer and Corporate Affairsis impracticable’’. See International Federation of Reproduction Rights
Canada, 1980); J. Keon, A Performing Right for Sound Recordings: AnSocieties, online: http://www.ifrro.org (date accessed: 14 January, 2003).
Analysis (Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada); Keyes & Brunet,15 For example, often rights are governed by multiple collective manage- supra note 21; L. Liebowitz, Copyright Obligations for Cable Televsion:ment societies within a particular nation. Coordination is therefore Pros and Cons (Consumer and Corporate Affairs); D. Magnusson and V.required not only between national collective management societies, but Nabhan, Exemptions Under the Canadian Copyright Act (Consumerthen on an international basis between collective management societies. and Corporate Affairs); D. Smith, ibid.; and B. Torno, Fair Dealing: TheThere is a significant lack of standards among many collective manage- Need for Conceptual Clarity on the Road to Copyright Revision (Con-ment societies. Identification alone of an underlying right and right- sumer and Corporate Affairs).sholder can be a convoluted process.
34 Economic Council of Canada (1971) at 151; cited by D. Smith, supra16 As one author notes, ‘‘efficiency will be what, in the end, members and note 32, at 3, recommended that:music users most want and will most easily recognize, however it is
. . . an adjustment of the Copyright Act to permit the wider use ofmeasured’’. See J. Hutchinson, ‘‘Collection and Distribution of Per-
the performing-rights-society approach, including its extension intoforming and Mechanical Royalties: A View from the UK’’ (July, 1998) 84
the field of printed and other materials . . . [and] that powers of theCopyright World 30 at 32.
Copyright Appeal Board to regulate the fees and royalties of such17 As Peter Drucker notes, ‘‘efficiency is doing better what is already being
‘‘collectives’’ and the powers of the Minister to issue compulsorydone’’. See P. Drucker, Innovation & Entrepreneurship: Practices and licenses must also be enlarged.Principles (London: Heineman, 1986), where Drucker discusses the
35 Keyes & Brunet, supra note 23 at 212, likewise called for reforms:nexus between technology, innovation and efficiency.
18 Licensing, collecting and enforcing copyright may now be done on an . . . creators and owners of copyright should organize to protect their
individual basis through the aid of technologies such as digital rights rights and to exploit them in a way that satisfies both their interests
management systems. While the authors’ do not adopt the view that and the contemporary needs of society . . . it should be possible to
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already existing and to devise new contractual arrangements 51 D. Gervais, ‘‘Collective Management of Copyright and Neighbouring
adapted to the nature of those rights to be collectively exercised. Rights in Canada: An International Perspective’’ (2002) 1 Canadian
Journal of Law & Technology, 21, 39.36 D. Smith, supra note 32 at 5, provides a succinct summary for the
reorganization of collectives to account for new technologies, uses and 52 Ibid., at 39-40.
changes in the market: 53 H. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 20 at 135.
The rationale for the extension of the principles underlying the 54 For instance, imagine if corporations such as MTV or MuchMusic negoti-existing musical performing rights societies to other areas is
ated the use and fee for each song/video it broadcasted with individualdescribed by Keyes and Brunet in the context of new and previously
artists. While artists such as U2 or Madonna would be in a position tounanticipated uses of protected material. In the realm of photo-
negotiate on a balanced power basis, the same would not be said for newcopying, for example, Keyes and Brunet point out that existing
groups struggling to find any airtime.concepts of fair dealing approved by authors and publishers predate
widespread photocopying. Copying for private use has clearly been 55 The recent Supreme Court of Canada decision of Théberge reiterated the
undertaken since the print media began, but until recently this need for a balanced approach and also emphasized the importance of the
copying was relatively infrequent, limited in length and generally public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation:
unlikely to compete significantly with the copyright material.
31  The proper balance among these and other public policy objec-37 S.C. 1988, c. 65. tives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving
due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it38 J. Matejcek, supra note 23 at 104.
would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the39 See Copyright Board Annual Report 1989-1990, at 10. right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompen-
sate them.40 R.S.C. 1997, c. 24.
41 Prior to 1997, the definition of ‘‘collective society’’ only applied to the 32  Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of
general licensing regime under section 70.1 of the Copyright Act. In the intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public
1997 ammendments, the definition of a collective society was changed to domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the
read: long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles
to proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyrightA ‘‘collective society’’ means a society, association or corporation that
infringement enumerated in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to protect thecarries on the business of collective administration of copyright or of
public domain in traditional ways such as fair dealing for the pur-the remuneration right conferred by section 19 or 81 of the benefit
pose of criticism or review and to add new protections to reflectof those who, by assignment, grant of licence, appointment of it as
new technology, such as a limited computer program reproductiontheir agent or otherwise, authorize it to act on their behalf in rela-
and ‘‘ephemeral recordings’’ in connection with live performances.tion to that collective administration, and ( a) operates a licensing
scheme, applicable in relation to a repertoire of works, performer’s Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc. (2002) SCC 34, at
performances, sound recordings or communication signals of more para. 31-32.
than one author, performer, sound recording maker or broadcaster, 56 Ibid.pursuant to which the society, association or corporation sets out
classes of uses that it agrees to authorize under this Act, and the 57 Some of this text is an updated version of an article by this author,
royalties and terms and conditions on which it agrees to authorize D. Gervais, entitled, ‘‘Lock-It Up or License’’, published as a chapter in
those classes of uses, or (b) carries on the business of collecting and H. Hanson (ed.) International Intellectual Property Law & Policy (6th ed.)
distributing royalties or levies payable pursuant to this Act. (New York: Juris Publishing, 2000).
42 ‘‘Neighbouring rights’’ refer to the public performance and communica- 58 Many national copyright regimes allow for exceptions such as fair dealing
tion to the public by telecommunication of sound recordings of musical or fair use. Under such exemptions, users are allowed to perform acts
work, for the benefit of the performers of these works and the makers of which they would otherwise not be authorized to do. For example, users
the sound recording. are often allowed to ‘‘tinker’’ with the source code of a computer pro-
gram for the purpose of enhancing and adapting such programs. This is43 The private copying of recorded musical works for the benefit of the
known as reverse engineering.rights owners in the works, the recorded performances and the sound
recordings. 59 This may be characterized as the ‘‘all or nothing’’ approach. If a creator
makes available a work on the Internet, the ability to control the dissemi-44 Some commentators believe that a fifth category could be said to exist,
nation and use of the work is lost. The alternative is simply not to makeconsisting of ‘‘unregulated collectives’’. As Grant commented, ‘‘A com-
available works over the Internet.pany that licensed the use of the works of multiple authors to users can
avoid the application of the general licensing body regime by declining 60 It is important to note that the market remains immature. It is too earlyto operate a ‘licensing scheme’.’’ In particular, if that company does not to conclusively determine that users will opt en masse to download freedeal with users on a ‘‘general tariff’’ basis but negotiates each use individ- pirated versions of copyright works. A good example of this is the MP3ually, then it may not necessarily qualify as a ‘‘licensing body’’ under phenomenon. While Napster may have been shut down, other sites havesection 70.1 of the Act. P. Grant, supra note 27 at 199. This may be true, since emerged to facilitate file-swapping of music. This, however, is notbut does not impact one way or the other on our analysis. determinative of the state of the market. Companies offering on-line
45 A comprehensive list is provided of the various tariffs on the Copyright subscription services for downloading music have likewise seen a steady
Board’s Web site. Online: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca (date accessed: 14 Jan- increase in sales. There is a common thread to both of these phenomena,
uary 2003). accessing works in digital format is something that consumers want.
46 Decisions regarding music performances may be found online: Copy- 61 D. Gervais, supra note 57. In this study, the author examines in detail
right Board Canada Web site, http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/music- methods of adapting systems to facilitate access to works.
e.html (date accessed: 14 January, 2003). 62 See for example: J. Hutchinson, supra note 16; H. Cohen Jehoram, supra47 Refer to the Copyright Board’s Web site online: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/ note 20; and C. Jarvis, infra note 63.
decisions/retransmission-e.html (date accessed: 14 January 2003). 63 Others have advanced the view that collectives are preferred to individu-48 See the decisions on private copying online: Copyright Board Canada alized licensing based on the balanced footing argument. For example, C.
Web site: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/copying-e.html (date Jarvis articulates:
accessed: 14 January, 2003).
And would it not be the case that setting up a ‘‘digital shop’’ offering49 As some have suggested, perhaps far too many collectives. See Sunny works at set prices via the Internet will surely remove any user’s
Handa, Copyright Law in Canada (Markham: Buttersworth, 2002) at 357: ability to negotiate according to individual circumstances. And,
The large number of collective management societies according to the probably more importantly, how will the user know that the price is
author makes it, ‘‘difficult to navigate through the myriad of organiza- fair and reasonable? It is also not clear how any user will be able to
tions in order to make a simple use of a work’’. work out who a particular copyright owner might be in such an
50 A list of Canadian collective societies with Web links is available online: environment (the collecting societies provide a unique ‘‘portal’’ in
Copyright Board Canada Web site http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/societies/ this respect) — so this could create another barrier to use that does
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See C. Jarvis, ‘‘Broadcasts: Collective Licensing — The End or a New ‘‘the communication must originate from a server in Canada’’; ‘‘commu-
Beginning? Found in Collective Licensing: Past, Present and Future’’ nications triggered by an embedded hyperlink occur at the site to which
(Netherlands: MAKLU Publishing, 2002) at 97. the link leads’’; for a cache, ‘‘the communication occurs at the location of
the host or mirror site from which the cache originally obtained the64 M. Kretschmer, ‘‘The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administra-
information’’. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that ation: Rethinking Copyright Societies as Regulatory Instruments’’ (2002)
communication to the public is made, ‘‘when the transmission of mate-E.I.P.R. 126 at 133. Under this theory, rightsholders will use digital rights
rial from the server occurs, and not when the content provider choosesmanagement systems to control and disseminate the use of their works.
the means through which to communicate’’. Re SOCAN Statement ofThe author explains:
Royalties (Tariff 22, Internet), [2002] FCA 166 at para 133; [1999] 1 C.P.R.
In short, the transaction cost argument for collective administration (4th) 417.
from the cost of individual contracting may support not a universal 74 Refer to the CMRRA and SODRAC filings at the Copyright Boardrights administration system (to which all rightsholders have access
online: Copyright Board Canada Web site http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tar-on similar terms), but a system where the major rightholders selec-
iffs/proposed/mn11052002-b.pdf (date accessed: 14 January, 2003).tively decide, supported by sophisticated information technology,
whether collecting licence fees is worthwhile. 75 By way of example, there has been much debate as to whether the
retransmission regime applies to Internet broadcasting. Many interest65 The proliferation of digital technology presents problems both to authors
groups have lobbied to amend the Act to exclude Internet retransmis-and copyright holders, as well as for users. As one author notes:
sions. For more information about the debate surrounding Internet
The advent of the digital age has allowed for new technologies to retransmission see, ‘‘Consultation Paper on the Application of the Copy-
put the power of creation in the hands of the masses as never before. right Act’s Compulsory Retransmission to the Internet’’, online: Canada’s
Similarly, digital technologies have allowed works of compilation Business  and Consumer s i te http ://www.strategis . ic .gc .ca/
(especially those that are in multimedia format) to develop at an SSG/1/rp0008e.html (date accessed: 14 January, 2003). Submissions and
unprecedented rate. For both creators of works, especially those that comments on retransmission are available online: Canada’s Business and
are not significant in size or value, and for those creating compila- Consumer site http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/rp01100e.html (date
tions or other works that require licensed rights from a large accessed: 14 January, 2003). This debate led to Bill C-48 An Act to Amend
number of rights holders, the Copyright Act creates a formidable the Copyright Act, passed by the House of Commons on June 18, 2002.
hurdle. Transaction costs in clearing rights (i.e., getting appropriate
76 See M. Einhorn and L. Kurlantzick, ‘‘Traffic Jam on the Music Highway’’licences and authorizations) are often extremely high relative to the
(2002) 8 J. of the Copyright Society of the USA 417. (‘‘Since these rightsvalue of the work being created and certainly as compared to the
are controlled by different parties and agents, the complexity of thevalue of the work being cleared. Rights clearance is undoubtedly
system leads to a gridlock of control that may hinder development.’’)one of the central copyright issues for the first half of the 21st
century. 77 A contract to allow Web casting normally refers to the function of
S. Handa, supra note 49 at 354. broadcasting, independently of whether a communication to the public,
one or more reproductions, or adaptations may take place. The problem66 For an expansive overview of the different underpinnings of a copyright
is that rights ownership is still by and large, especially in the area ofsystem see and compare: W.L. Hayhurst, ‘‘Intellectual Property Laws in
collective management, owned by different entities based on the rights,Canada: The British Tradition, the American Influence and the French
not the functions. While a single economic transaction should take place,actor’’ (1996) 10 I.P.J. 265; M. Goudreau, ‘‘Le droit moral de l’auteur au
several legal transactions are involved. See A. & B. Kohn. Kohn on MusicCanada’’ (1994) 25 R.D.G. 403; Y. Gendreau, ‘‘Moral Rights’’ in G.F.
Licensing (2nd ed.): 2000 Supplement (New York: Aspen Law & Busi-Henderson, ed. Copyright and Confidential Information Law in Canada
ness, 2000), at 398-9.(Toronto: Carswell, 1994) 161; D. Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2000) at 12; D. Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyrights, Patents, 78 See M. Einhorn and L. Kurlantzick, supra, note 75, at 417. (‘‘At least four
Trade-Marks (Concord: Irwin Law, 1997); S. Handa, supra note 49; H.G. distinct rights are implicated in the use of any piece of recorded music in
Fox, The Canadian Law of Copyright (Toronto: University of Toronto digital audio.’’) M. Lemley, ‘‘Dealing with overlapping Copyrights on the
Press, 1944) at 12–32; Mikus, Droit de l’edition et du commerce du livre Internet’’ (1997) 22 Dayton L. Rev. 548 at 565–6. (‘‘Consider the case of
(Montreal: Editions Thémis, 1996). an individual who provides an ‘Internet radio’ service to subscribers,
selecting and sending digital versions of recorded songs via the Internet67 Refer to note 1 where the idea of chaos theory was introduced and
in real time. If this individual transmits a copyrighted song, what copy-paralleled with fragmentation. Chaos theory looks at unstable periodic
right violations have occurred? He has made a copy of the song in hisbehavior. That is, there is no regular repetition of values making future
computer by loading the song in the first place, violating the reproduc-prediction impossible. Oddly enough, however, one would expect such
tion rights of both the owner of the musical composition copyright and‘‘chaos’’ to prevent any form of organization when, in fact, a coherent,
the owner of the sound recording copyright. He has also caused addi-albeit somewhat intangible, system emerges.
tional copies of the song to be made in the computers of each of the68 In an Australian copyright study it was noted that, ‘‘identifying and recipients, constituting more violations of each right. If fixation in RAM is
finding copyright owners for the purpose of obtaining clearances was the sufficient for copyright infringement, he has made or caused to be made
issue most strongly identified by the producer respondents as their copy- a minimum of seven copies, and more likely a few dozen, for each
right concern in relation to multimedia’’. See J. Fitzgerald, ‘‘Licensing recipient of the service. Again, each of these copies potentially violates the
Content for Multimedia,’’ (July, 1998) 84 Copyright World 23 at 23. rights of two different copyright owners.’’)
69 See D. Gervais, La notion d’œuvre dans la Convention de Berne et en 79 See online: Screenwriters Guild of America http://screenwritersguild.orgdroit comparé (Genève : Droz, 1998). The setting of applicable tariffs for (date accessed: 14 January, 2003). Canadian organizations representingInternet use of music was explored in the controversial ‘‘Tariff 22’’ Deci- screenwriters include the Writers Guild of Canada, which created a newsion. Infra note 73 and accompanying text. collective, the Canadian Screenwriter Collection Society (CSCS). See
70 In the case of the use of music, users could obtain a licence from SOCAN online :  Canadian Screenwriter  Col lect ion Society http ://
to play/use music for karaoke, skating arenas, bars, and public perform- www.writersguildofcanada.com/cscs/index.html (date accessed: 14 Jan-
ances. The demarcation lines with the Internet, however, did not neatly uary, 2003).
fit within existing uses and licences. For example, what if a band chose to 80 A. and H.-J. Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique (2nd ed).perform an Alannis Morrisette song streamed in realtime which would
(Paris : Litec, 2001) at 222–3.be shown live in a bar in Toronto. The advent of the Internet poses new
challenges to such traditional licences. 81 Ibid. at 172. See also Articles 2, 7 and 9 EU Council Directive
92/100/EEC of November 19, 1992 on rental right and lending right and71 Of course, each fragment can itself be split. The owner of the right for the
on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual propertyhardcover edition may not be the same as for paperback.
(OJ L 346, 27.11.1992, as amended by Council Directive 93/98/EEC of72 Because they needed to make temporary copies of material to be broad- 29 October 1993 (OJ. L 290, 24.11.1993)).
cast and this involved another right, legislators in several countries,
82 Many composers changed their U.S. performing right affiliation fromincluding Canada (supra note 2 at ss. 30.8 and 30.9 of the Act), opted for
ASCAP to BMI, or vice versa, and may thus have rights that at a certainso-called ‘‘ephemeral recordings’’.
point in time were administered by one society and later by another.73 The Copyright Board addressed the issue when a communication occurs
to the public via the Internet in its Tariff 22 decision. In answering 83 iCraveTV was not able to survive even the first round of litigation.































































Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management 31
current market. Broadcasting online, whether it is television or radio, has identical rights should not be encouraged, rather, potentially monopo-
yet to find a viable business model. listic societies should be controlled and regulated’’. See Keyes & Brunet,
supra note 21 at 215.84 M. Einhorn, supra note 76 at 420.
95 These would seem to follow the best practices emerging from ongoing85 Collectives have gained essential experience in developing successful
efforts in countries other than the U.S. This will be explored in greaterlicensing models, establishing a strong customer basis, and have experi-
detail when addressing centralized licensing regimes or one-stop-shopence working with the various artists and distributors of content.
services.86 Electronic rights management systems (ERMS) are also referred to as 96 Internationally, very few countries have adopted compulsory licensing ofdigital rights management systems (DRMS) and copyright management
digital uses. Such a system exists in the Danish legislation but has yet tosystems (CMS).
be applied in practice. It would be an extension of the licence existing87 See J. Cunard, ‘‘Technological Protection of Copyrighted works and under ss. 13 and 14 of the Danish Copyright Act, 14/06/1995, No. 395.
Copyrighted Management Systems: A Brief Survey of the Landscape,’’ 97 The report tabled by the Minister of Industry and the Minister of Cana-ALAI Congress 2001. See also D. Gervais, ‘‘Electronic Rights Management
dian Heritage pursuant to s. 92 of the Act refers to this as a potentialand Digital Identifier Systems’’ (1999), online: The Journal of Electronic
solution. See ‘‘Supporting Culture and Innovation: Report on the Provi-Publishing http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/04-03/gervais.html  (date
sions and Operation of the Copyright Act’’ (2002), online: Government ofaccessed: 15 January 2003).
Canada Web site http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/rp00863e.html (date88 Many licences to use a work are granted where the user obtains permis- accessed: 15 January, 2003). The issue of extended licensing is discussed
sion for several different uses of a work. It may be the case that the user at section B.1.1. of the Report, ‘‘Collective management of copyright.’’
only requires the work for a specific purpose. Why should the user pay to 98 See P. Grant, supra note 27 at 209. Grant espouses the idea that theacquire rights to use a work in a manner for which he/she has no
advantage of collectives is that they reduce transmission costs and allowintention of using it for?
for greater efficiencies. He argues that the regulatory regime within the89 The Wall Street Journal Online and The New York Times on the Web Copyright Act allows for a dominant collective to emerge and forces
utilize a technology called ‘‘Rightslink’’. This technology allows a user to users to deal only with that particular collective. This greatly facilitates
click on the ‘‘Rightslink’’ icon. The system will prompt the user to the advance clearance of rights. From the authors’ point of view, such
provide certain information, and agree to a set of terms. At this point the efficiencies were gained by virtue of the fact that works were not necessa-
user may e-mail the article to a friend or colleague or reprint and repub- rily multi-purpose. One could purchase the licensing rights to a song for
lish the article. See online: Rightslink http://rightslink.copyright.com example, or to use a photograph. The situation is complicated by the
(date accessed: 15 January 2003). proliferation of multimedia where rights are not as easily broken down.
90 Examples include Content Scrambling System (CSS) and Secure Digital 99 See T. Koskinen-Olsson, ‘‘Copyright, Repography & Digital Use’’, online:
Music Initiative (SDMI). See online: Secure Digital Music Initiative Web Kopiosto http://www.kopiosto.fi/tiedotus/sida.htm (date accessed: 15 Jan-
site www.sdmi.org (date accessed: 15 January 2003). uary 2003). See also S. Simpson, ‘‘Review of Australian Collecting Socie-
ties’’ (1995), online: Department of Communications, Information Tech-91 One of the better known early examples of a DRM model is the Euro-
nology and the Arts Home Page http://www.dcita.gov.au (date accessed:pean Imprimatur Project. This particular DRM can be broken down into
15 January, 2003).four key components: a unique identification number, an intellectual
property rights database, a monitoring service provider and a certification 100 As it stands, collectives sometimes negotiate different licensing terms
authority. See G. Greenleaf, ‘‘IP, Phone Home: The Uneasy Relationship and fees with users regardless of whether the actual ‘‘use’’ of the work is
Between Copyright and Privacy’’ (2002) 32 (1) HKLJ 35 at 47. See also L. similar in nature.
Bygrave and K. Koelman, ‘‘Privacy, Data Protection and Copyright: Their 101 This might also provide the impetus for collaboration of establishing fairInteraction in the Context of Electronic Copyright Management Sys-
and competitive user fees.tems ’ ’  (1998) ,  online: Imprimatur Services Limited http://
www.imprimatur.net/IMP_FTP/privreportdef.pdf (date accessed: 16 Jan- 102 The Board had ‘‘combined’’ the CPRS and CAPAC tariff prior to their
uary 2003). merger.
92 The slow adoption of legal music sites is one such example. In fact, even 103 See supra note 55.
sites backed by large record companies face copyright hurdles. See Amy 104 By discriminatory, we are referring to different fees for different users, asHarmon, ‘‘Copyright Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet’’, well as different compensation schemes for different creators, many ofThe New York Times, Sept. 23, 2002, online: New York Times Online whom are members of the same collective.http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/23/technology/23MUSI.html (date
105 It has been asked in the S.92 Report in section B.2.8, ‘‘Whether sectionsaccessed: 15 January 2003). The amount of controversy of the ‘‘Berman
29 and 29.1 of the Act should be amended to expand the scope of fairCopyright Bill’’, which would allow copyright holders to find and inter-
dealing to ensure that it does not exclude activities that are sociallyrupt downloads of material they think is unauthorized. See Declan
beneficial and cause little prejudice to rights holders’ ability to exploitMcCullagh, ‘‘Hollywood hacking bill hits House’’, CNET News.com, July
their works and other subject matter.’’ Supra note 97. Such an expansion2 5 ,  2 0 0 2 ,  o n l i n e :  C N e t  N e w s . c o m  h t t p : / /
of fair dealings might include a right to browse materials available onnews.com.com/2100-1023-946316.html (date accessed: 15 January 2003);
the Internet or might refer to time transferring on the Internet.and by the same author ‘‘P2P foes defend hacking bill’’, CNET
News.com, Sept, 26, 2002, online: CNET News.com <http:// 106 This is often why users choose to create new works or to use works in
news.com.com/2100-1023-959774.html> (date accessed: 15 January the public domain. If works subject to copyright were automatically
2003). As we have argued elsewhere (see Daniel Gervais, ‘‘Copyright and covered under a compulsory licence, one would speculate increase in
eCommerce’’, in Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace (2nd the actual use of such works.
ed), 2002 Supplement (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2002), at 16A.5, the 107 Of Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No.question is whether content providers should use all their resources to
99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.minimize unauthorized uses, or rather maximize authorized (paid) ones.
Clearly, the assumption that every unauthorized copy is a lost sale is 108 Of April 15, 1994, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
wrong. On this point see Reuters ‘‘KPMG study faults entertainment the World Trade Organization (‘‘WTO Agreement’’), (1994) 33 I.L.M.
companies’ focus on piracy’’, Sept. 24, 02, online: SiliconValley.com http:/ 1197.
/www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/4144704.htm 109 See D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis
(date accessed: 15 January 2003). (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 88–91.
93 These systems often perform several functions. The first, if so required, is 110 Although clearly not a violation of the text of TRIPS, one could argue
to break down the rights in a work (more the case with multimedia that the extended licence has the effect of impairing, to a certain degree,
works). The second function is to identify the rightsholder(s) of the work. the exercise of exclusive rights and that nullifies and impairs expected
The third function is then to clear these rights, followed by establishing benefits under the TRIPS Agreement. Under GATT and WTO law,
licence terms, and payment of fees for the use of a work. Such technolo- member States may win a panel decision even without a violation of the
gies facilitate the expediency and efficiency of licensing content online. text of any WTO agreement, if they could show such nullification or
See T. Koskinen-Olsson, ‘‘Secure IPR-Content on the Internet’’ ALAI impairment of benefits reasonably expected under the Agreement. See
Congress 2001. WTO Agreement, Article XXIII; and J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the
94 Interestingly enough, this potential problem was addressed in the 1977 Law of GATT (Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1969), at 178–186.
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of intellectual property until January 1, 2000, and such suspension was ‘‘The subject of the INDECS project is the creation of a common
extended indefinitely at the Doha Ministerial Conference in paragraph format — a unique metadata code — to achieve a high level of inter-
11.1 of the Decision Concerning Implementation-related issues and operability between different identification systems.’’
concerns of 20 November 2001, WTO document WT/MIN(01)/17, 116 EFRIS stands for the Extended Frankfurt Rights Information System. Seeonline: World Trade Organization http://www.wto.org/english/ Schippan, ibid.thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm (date
‘‘The aim of the EFRIS project is to intensify the transaction aroundaccessed: 15 January 2003). See also Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agree-
the Frankfurt Book Fair by encouraging the adoption of Internet-ment: Drafting History and Analysis, ibid. at 249-50.
based-standards and thus facilitating the trade with multimedia111 M. Ficsor, supra note 13. rights.’’
112 As H. Cohen Jehoram notes in the European context: 117 The TV FILES project refers to the Intellectual Property Rights for TV
Programmes. Schippan, supra note 115.
The changes which must be realized in the present copyright socie-
‘‘TV FILES seeks to establish a database with audiovisual works toties are not to be underestimated. It is not just a question of tech-
create a contact network between European TV programme buyers,nical automation. That would only be a relatively minor operation.
film producers and multimedia producers.’’It is to be feared, however, that a psychological and political water-
shed is also at issue here: that human minds will have to change, 118 PRISAM refers to the Producers Rights Information System for Audiovi-
always a painful operation. Copyright societies have historically been sual and Multimedia. Schippan, supra note 115.
created by professional artistic and literary associations, which repre-
‘‘PRISAM’s aim is to create a ‘one-stop information shop’ to facilitatesented not only the individual interests of their members, but also
negotiations between European producers and editors of mul-the interests of the profession as such. The old leveling system of
timedia products on the one hand and rightsholders on the other . . .fixed tariffs for everyone was not only dictated by efficiency, but it
The one-stop information shop will contain all sorts of audiovisualalso the interests of the profession as such. The old leveling system of
works needed for the development of multimedia products, exceptfixed tariffs for everyone was not only dictated by efficiency, but it
for news and sports events.’’also met certain social concerns of the associations for their less
successful members. The present trend towards radical individuali- 119 ORS refers to Open Rights System. Schippan, supra note 115.
zation in general is squarely contrary to these concerns. Copyright in
‘‘The subject of ORS is to construct a prototype software whichthe hands of the reorganized societies will be an unmitigated capi-
would enable producers of multimedia software to obtain fromtalistic tool, a mere instrument to have rights smoothly and precisely
right owners the necessary authorization to use objects or workstaken care of in electronic commerce. The present collective admin-
protected by intellectual property rights.’’istration will have to give way to central administration of rights.
120 BONA FIDE is the Broker-Based Network Architecture for Fail-Safe IPRSupra note 20 at 137.
Clearance of Digital Content. Schippan, supra note 115 at 27.
113 B. Hugenholtz identifies several licensing problems for multimedia ‘‘BONA FIDE aims to develop a pilot broker system designed to
products in Europe including: multiplicity of rights, multiplicity of register, store, distribute and monitor usage of multimedia material.’’
rights owners, overlapping rights, legal insecurity, lack of established
121 Ibid.licensing practices and foot dragging. See B. Hugenholtz, ‘‘Copyright
and Multimedia: Licensing in the Digital Era’’ (1996), speech for the ‘‘The ‘before copyright’ project foresees the establishment of a net-
Congresso Europeo Derecho Audiovisual online: Instituut voor Informa- work-connected agency whose main task is to co-ordinate the activi-
tierecht http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/PBH5.doc (date ties of multimedia producers in the audiovisual sector at a very early
accessed: 15 January 2003). stage.’’
In July 1995, the European Commission issued the European Com- 122 COMPAS is the Copyright Management and Multimedia Rights Clear-
mission Green Paper of 27 July 1995 on Copyright and Related ance Best Practices for Educational Multimedia. Schippan, supra note
Rights in the Information Society (‘‘Green Paper’’ online: SCADPlus 115.
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24152.htm (date accessed:
‘‘The aim of COMPAS is to identify the main difficulties involved in15 January 2003)). One of the key issues identified in the Green
funding, producing, distributing and marketing multimedia prod-Paper was the complicated licensing problems involved in pro-
ucts designed for training and educational purposes, review currentducing and publishing multimedia works. The Green Paper called
procedures for managing multimedia rights and streamline them byfor the need to create ‘‘clearing houses’’ which would act as a form
developing common reference standards.’’of a centralized licensing agent or as they are now referred to as,
‘‘one-stop-shop’’ services. Thus, collectives would utilize the clear- 123 RCTRIDW is the Rights Clearance for a Trans-Regional Integrated
ance centre to facilitate the acquisition and management of mul- Digital Warehouse. Supra note 115.
timedia rights. The Green Paper, however, rejected the idea that ‘‘RCTRIDW sets out to study the feasibility of creating a mul-these ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ centres should be non-voluntary opting timedia rights clearance system for a digital multimedia warehouseinstead, to leave it to the market. operating across seven European minority-language regions and
designed to allow transregional commercial exploitation of public114 France: In 1995, SESAM was the first clearing centre to be established in
sector film, TV and radio archive.’’Europe. It incorporates five collective management societies: ADAGP,
SACD, SACEM, SCAM, and SDRM (See SESAM online: http:// 124 VERDI is the acronym for ‘‘Very Extensive Rights Data Information.’’
www.sesam.org (date accessed: 15 January 2003). Another excellent over- See Schippan, supra note 115.
view of SESAM use of digital rights management systems may be found
125 T. Ueno, ‘‘Taking a Step Forward Toward Achieving Harmonizationin B. Salvas, ‘‘La gestion collective à l’heure d’Internet,’’ (2000) 13 C.P.I.
and Cooperation Between Technology and Law’’ online: http://139). Germany: In Germany, CMMV was formed in 1996 and is com-
www.cric.or.jp/cric_e/cuj/cuj99/cuj99_3.html.prised of nine collecting societies: GEMA, GVL, VG WORT, GÜFA,
GWFF, VG BILDKUNST, VFF, VGF, and AGICOA (See online: CMMV 126 See Zentaro Kitagawa, ‘‘Future of the Copyright Law System’’, lecture
Home Page http://www.cmmv.de (date accessed: 15 January 2003)). presented at the symposium ‘‘Copymart: The Product and its Prospects’’,
Netherlands: CEDAR was formed in the Netherlands exclusively to held in Berlin on Sept. 5 and 6, 2002 (on file with authors — to be
address multimedia rights clearance. Its wide variety of members consist published). See also online: Copymart Home Page http://
of: Beeldrecht, Burafo, Buma/Stema, Foto Aoniem, Leenrecht, Lira, www.copymart.gr.jp/english/tophome_e.html (date accessed: 15 January
Musiopy, Nieuwswaarde, Pro, Reprorecht, SCRIO, and de Thuiskopie. 2003).
Many of these members are, in turn, comprised of a multiple of societies. 127 Ibid.(See online: CEDAR http://www.cedar.nl (date accessed 15 January
2003). Others include Finland’s KOPIOSTO, Italy’s SIAE, Norway’s 128 See online: Copyright Clearance Center http://www.copyright.com
CLARA, Spain’s OM and Sweden’s COPYSWEDE. (date accessed: 15 January 2003).
115 INDECS is the Interoperability of Data in E-Commerce Systems. See 129 While such systems may be fostered and funded by governments, they
Schippan, ‘‘Purchase and Licensing of Digital Rights: The VERDI Project are often voluntary. Likewise, market players have had a large influence
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130 J. Hutchinson, supra note 16 at 32. 145 For a detailed account of this agreement see http://www.nmpa.org/
nmpa/nv-sf97/cannes.html.131 Although one important step in this direction is the so-called Santiago
Agreement, which clarifies among performing rights collectives that the 146 See (1998) 157 GEMA News. Available online: GEMA News http://
licensor of a content provider shall be the society of the country where www.gema.de/engl/communication/news/n157/midem98.shtml (date
the content provider has its actual and economic location and that the accessed: 15 January 2003).
licence granted to the content provider is valid worldwide. See J. Becker, 147 For a more detailed description of this project see http://cisac.org/cisac/‘‘Santiago Agreement and ‘Fast Track’’’ (2001) 163 GEMA News. Online:
webcontent.nsf/midem2001.GEMA News http://www.gema.de/engl/communication/news/
n163/santiago.shtml (date accessed: 15 January 2003). If applied success- 148 The International Standard Audiovisual Number (ISAN). See ‘‘Terms Of
fully, this may not deal with all applicable rights (including public Reference For ISO/TC 46/SC 9 Working Group 1 for the development
performance/communication to the public and reproduction, and only of ISO Project 20925’’, ISO Document ISO/TC 46/SC 9/WG 1 N 189 of
covers a specific use). Still, it is a step in the right direction. June 19, 2002. Available online: National Library of Canada Web site
http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/iso/tc46sc9/wg1/wg1n189.pdf (date accessed: 15132 J. Channon, ‘‘Ring Tones,’’ in Collective Licensing: Past, Present and
January 2003).Future (Netherlands: MAKLU Publishers, 2002) at 85.
133 This is not to say that, as both technology and practices evolve, such a 149 See D. Wood, ‘‘Collective Management and EU Competition Law,’’
system would be unworkable at the mass market level, but that such a found in Collective Licensing: Past, Present and Future (Netherlands:
system for individual users is not yet feasible. MAKLU Publishers, 2002).
134 Mandating non-voluntary central licensing centers, however, may raise 150 A. Kabat proposes that a worldwide Internet collecting society be estab-
issues of competition law. lished. See A. Kabat, ‘‘Proposal for a Worldwide Internet Collecting
Society: Mark Twain and Samuel Johnson Licenses,’’ (1998) 45(3) J.135 Re SOCAN Statement of Royalties (Tariff 22, Internet), [1999] 1 C.P.R.
Copyright Soc. USA 337. B. Salvas makes an interesting comment on(4th) 417.
this solution:136 [2002] FCA 166.
Alan R. Kabat utilize justement comme argument en faveur de la137 Application for leave to appeal filed July 31, 2002. [2002] S.C.C.A. No.
creation d’une telle société de gestion collective unique consacrée à289.
Internet la difficulté d’en arriver à un dénominateur commun entre138 The case of iCraveTV is also relevant in this context. It raises doubts les différentes règles nationale régissant le droit d’auteur. Il soutient
about the extent to which Internet transmissions of broadcasts could que la creation d’une tel société unique, qu’il nomme WICS (World-
qualify as ‘‘retransmissions’’ and consequently benefit from the non- wide Internet Collecting Society).
licensing voluntary regime of section 31 of the Copyright Act. COPIBEC
Supra note 114 at 182.and CANCOPY have already obtained the right to licence certain dig-
ital secondary uses of printed material from several member right- 151 See E. Miller and J. Feigenbaum, ‘‘Taking the Copy Out of Copyright,’’sholders. (Information Society Project, Yale Law School, 2002), online: Computer
139 The notion of ‘‘société de perception’’ could perhaps appropriately be Science at Yale University http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/jf/MF.pdf
expanded to provide centralized administration of rights clearance. (date accessed: 10 January 2003).
140 For more information about this negotiation see http://www.biem.org. 152 See M. Lemley, supra note 78 at 583.
141 Ibid. 153 See Neil Netanel, ‘‘Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free
142 Ibid. P2P File-Swapping and Remixing’’, draft paper available online: Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/nnetanel/143 For example, the GEMA decisions held that rightsholders were free to
Levies_chapter.pdf (date accessed: 15 January 2003).assign their repertoires to the society offering the best terms. Another
example is EMI who established its own independent collection agent, 154 A digital transmission right was introduced in the Japanese Copyright
the Music Rights Society Europe (MRSE) as opposed to using a collective Act. See D. Gervais, ‘‘Transmissions of Music on the Internet: An Analysis
society. A final example involves the Central Licensing Agreement of the Copyright Laws of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United
which had been entered into between PolyGram Records and MCPS. Kingdom and the United States’’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt J. of Trasnat’l L.
The novel feature arising from this Agreement related to MCPS’s pro- 1363 at 1382.
posals in respect of accounting direct to publishers in the country of sale
155 See A. Christie, ‘‘A Proposal for Simplifying United Kingdom Copyrightrather than to the societies, thereby speeding up payments to publishers
Law’’, (2001) 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 26; and Shira Perlmutter, ‘‘Conver-and reducing commission costs.
gence and the Future of Copyrights’’ (2001) 24 Columbia-VLA J. L & the144 The standard contract between BIEM and IFPI may be found online: Arts 163.BEIM http://www.biem.org/biem/bportail.nsf/55f702a4cb425d15c
125692700379d1d/f1046b60cced4844c12569a5004a269d?OpenDocu- 156 See J. Ginsburg, ‘‘Can Copyright Become User-Friendly’’ (2002) 25
ment (date accessed: 15 January 2003). Columbia-VLA J. L & the Arts 71 at 83.
✄
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